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1 Introduction
Early in 2005 the editors of this IDS Bulletin began
developing a multi-country study to assess whether
sector-wide reforms of public services, involving
forms of decentralisation, pluralisation of service
providers, or user/citizen participation, could enable
greater accountability from below. Our interest was
in forms of accountability that could expand coverage
and improve the quality of public services for people
who live in poverty. In the previous two and a half
decades governments, first in the North and later in
the South, combined these reforms in myriad ways to
increase the responsiveness and quality of public
services. Many of these large institutional initiatives
sought, among other things, to establish direct and
ongoing accountability relations between service
providers and the end-users of services, or the
general public. State reformers with quite different
viewpoints continue to believe that such
accountability relations are a critical compliment, and
in some cases a substitute, to accountability from
above exercised by elected officials, and ultimately
voters, and by administrative hierarchy.
We decided to focus on ‘critical cases’, where
positive outcomes of accountability from below were
most likely to be found. The cases we selected,
therefore, were the large urban centres of countries
where reforms have been extensive and varied: São
Paulo in Brazil, Delhi in India, and Mexico City in
Mexico. Relative to other regions in the three
countries, and to other low- or middle-income
countries, these cities have more active civil societies,
have a substantial history of service delivery by public
agencies, and are focal points for public policy. It is in
these cities where national reforms can be expected
to produce changes in the pattern of state–society
interactions. We chose reforms of the health and
social assistance sectors, after taking into account
concerns with comparability between sectors and in
the reforms undertaken in each country. While these
sectors may not be the best cases of the
decentralisation–pluralisation–participation reforms
in each city, they seemed the most comparable
across the three given our concerns with their
impact on accountability relations. 
As we designed the study it became clear that two
competing notions of accountability from below exist
today. The first, inspired by the new public
management (NPM) movement that first emerged in
New Zealand and the United Kingdom during the
1970s, focuses on individual end-users as agents of
accountability. This notion of accountability is associated
with the creation of administrative complaint systems
and ‘choice’ reforms such as the pluralisation of
provision using market or pseudo-market mechanisms.
The second notion of accountability is collective, or
social, and emerged in new democracies during the
1990s. The agents of accountability are civil society
organisations and the media, rather than individuals,
and they use ‘voice’ to make state failures public and to
trigger other forms of accountability, including those
exercised by legislatures and judiciaries. 
Political processes can increase accountability, expand
coverage, and improve the quality of public services for
people who live in poverty. The social notion of
accountability from below we found the most useful for
the study, because it acknowledges the severe
constraints that exist on the agency of poor individuals,
particularly in highly unequal societies such as Brazil,
India and Mexico.1 The study, which acquired the title
‘Modes of Service Delivery, Collective Action and Social
Accountability in Brazil, India, and Mexico’, henceforth
BIM (for Brazil, India and Mexico), therefore focuses on
the potential of different types of state reform to
enhance social accountability rather than individual forms
Introduction: Contours of a Research
Project and Early Findings
Peter P. Houtzager and Anuradha Joshi
IDS Bulletin Volume 38  Number 6  January 2008  © Institute of Development Studies
1
of accountability. The research traces changes in the
relations between collective agents (or actors)
representing the poor, policymakers and service
providers in the areas of healthcare and social assistance.
The study examines three ideas. First, an idea which
is gaining currency: that the participation of actors
that represent poor and underserved communities in
policy negotiations and in direct accountability
relations with providers are critical to extending basic
public services to those communities. Second, the
idea that derives from institutionalist analyses: that
different types of institutional reforms of public
services will create distinct opportunities and barriers
to participation in policy and accountability. And
third, the idea that emerged from the slow accretion
of when actors who represent poor and underserved
communities have been a party to negotiating
reforms knowledge about network analysis: that
local actors will be more likely to establish relations
of social accountability with service providers in their
communities when they are part of larger networks
of actors who negotiate public policy. We agreed,
finally, that the study should also look at outcomes:
does social accountability lead to better service
coverage and quality?
The findings of BIM’s first year of fieldwork are
presented in this IDS Bulletin. The articles are case
studies that focus on the role of civil society actors
(or absence thereof) in the design of sectoral reforms
and the possibilities of social accountability that
accrue from this role. In addition to large
institutional reforms in social assistance and health,
the articles cover education reform in India as well. 
Early findings from the research emphasise that the
likelihood of social accountability increases
substantially when actors who represent poor and
underserved communities have been a party to
negotiating reforms; when such actors succeed in
engineering some form of institutional fit to state
decision-making centres which ensures their access
to policymakers over the medium to long term; and
when alliances between public sector reformists and
civil society actors are formed. 
The first set of articles in this IDS Bulletin introduces
the study and provides summary statements of
important conceptual and methodological issues, as
well as some of the overarching findings from year
one. Joshi provides a conceptual exploration of social
accountability and identifies its empirical referents.
Gurza Lavalle highlights the contextualised nature of
the politics of reform in each of the countries and
cities, linking local political dynamics to the reform
options that have been chosen. In their discussion of
the study’s methodology, Houtzager and Acharya
make a link between the institutional environment
that supports governance research and the study’s
research design. MacPherson challenges the NPM
view of end-users as generic agents of accountability,
arguing that it is women who, within the household
division of labour, are responsible for accessing public
services such as health and education, and that
women’s agency is constrained in ways different from
that of men.
The second set of articles examines social
accountability in social assistance services. Here the
focus is on anti-poverty programmes: the provision of
subsidised food and kerosene in Delhi through the
Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS), and the
new type of income grant or cash transfers in São
Paulo and Mexico. Pande focuses on the successful
accountability role of advocacy non-governmental
organisation (NGO) Parivatan in Delhi’s TPDS, which
reduced corruption and increased access to the
programme. She pays close attention to Parivatan’s
use of Right to Information litigation. Houtzager
examines the new Minimum Family Income
Guarantee Programme (known as Renda Mínima) in
São Paulo, a predecessor of the national Bolsa
Família programme, and argues that the silence of
civil society in the programme’s formulation and social
accountability was manufactured by policymakers.
Hevia explores the ultimately failed effort of the
conditional cash transfer programme Oportunidade in
Mexico to eliminate the intermediation of ‘bad civil
society’ and to encourage direct citizen participation. 
The next set of articles identify the extensive but
varied roles civil society actors have played in positively
evaluated sector-wide reforms in health and
education. Dowbor identifies the central role played
by the public health Sanitarista movement in the
creation of Brazil’s Unified Health System (Sistema
Único de Saúde, SUS) which universalises public
healthcare. The influence women’s advocacy NGOs of
the National Forum for Health and Population Policy
(Foro Nacional de Salud y Políticas de Población) have
had on the reform and universalisation of
reproductive health is the subject of Gómez-
Jauregui’s contribution. Chakrabarti explores the
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bagdari programme in Delhi, and shows how this
reform to institutionalise participation in urban
governance has fallen under the domination of
middle-class organisations, potentially at a cost to the
poor. Mehtta examines the multiple roles civil society
organisations have played in the delivery and
accountability of elementary (public) education in
Delhi, including through the Right to Food Campaign.
Concluding this IDS Bulletin, Jayal offers a final
reflection on the potential contribution of BIM to
theorising social accountability, and points out some
important ambiguities in the notion of social
accountability.
1.1 Social accountability
In this IDS Bulletin social accountability is understood
as an ongoing and collective effort to hold public
officials and service providers to account for the
provision of public goods which are existing state
obligations, such as primary healthcare, education,
sanitation and security. This accountability is exercised
by collective agents such as neighbourhood
associations, social movements, advocacy NGOs, and
media organisations through non-electoral
mechanisms (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000). The
core strategy of social accountability is making state
failures in meeting existing legal obligations public,
including the failure to provide service coverage to
the poor or to provide services consonant with
existing legal standards or procedures. Collective
actors use institutional and non-institutional channels
to monitor state activity or inactivity. By making state
failure public, they impose reputational and political
costs on the agencies involved and often trigger
other forms of accountability, including through the
courts, ombudsmen, public accounting or auditing
bodies, or legislative oversight (Peruzzotti and
Smulovitz 2006).
One of the advantages of social accountability, Jayal
points out, is that ‘it can be catalysed on demand as
and when the situation requires’. Compared to the
very broad and periodic (or discontinuous) nature of
electoral accountability, social accountability provides
a sharper, or more targeted, form of accountability
focused on a particular set of issues and a specific set
of (elected or non-elected) actors. Because it can be
used ‘on demand’, the timing of accountability
efforts, such as public exposure of failures or wrong-
doing, or activating other forms of accountability,
becomes a valuable political and strategic asset.
Joshi makes two important distinctions in her
contribution. First, she distinguishes between the
accountability to individuals advocated by NPM-
inspired reforms, such as the Citizen Complaint
System of Mexico’s Oportunidades, and social
accountability to collective agents that have a broad
public interest. The latter is well exemplified by the
Right to Information Campaign and the advocacy
NGO Parivatan, which sought to improve access to
the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) in
Delhi. This distinction is important because it
acknowledges the power disparities between poor
individuals and public officials, and the poor and non-
government service providers, in most social
contexts. It focuses attention on what agency poor
communities do have: the rightousness and/or
legality of their claims and the power of numbers.2
For improving the coverage and quality of public
services in poor and underserved communities, social
accountability is therefore particularly relevant. 
Second, she stresses the distinction between
participation in policy deliberation and social
accountability. While some researchers refer to both
as social accountability, Joshi argues convincingly for
the need to separate them analytically. The analytic
distinction is important because not only are very
different processes involved, with distinct dilemmas
and obstacles, but there may in fact be a conflict or
tension between these two roles. Can civil society
organisations that are parties to policy negotiations
also act as forceful watchdogs of the implementation
of these policies, and act as agents of accountability?
That question is an important one and the answer is
not obvious, and certainly not simple. Without the
analytic distinction it cannot be asked.
One of the critiques of social accountability is that it
lacks teeth. Civil society organisations can force state
officials to be ‘answerable’ for their action or
inaction but, critics suggest, they have no ability to
impose sanctions and force compliance – that is
‘enforcement’ capacity (Schedler 1999). A critical
feature of social accountability, as it is emerging out
of the practices of civil society actors, is its linkage to
other forms of accountability to produce
enforcement, however. Publicity – i.e. making state
failure public – and litigation through the court
system trigger forms of accountability from above, by
other state institutions. Publicity has triggered
investigations not only by legislative bodies, but also
by independent regulator or auditing bodies, as well
IDS Bulletin Volume 38  Number 6  January 2008 3
as public prosecutors such as those belonging to
Brazil’s Ministerio Público. Litigation, including that
involving the Right to Information, has played a
particularly prominent role in India (Joshi, Pande,
Mehtta, and Jayal, this IDS Bulletin). 
2 The study: making services responsive to the
poor
The study from which this IDS Bulletin’s articles are
drawn traces the interaction of collective actors who
represent users in poor urban communities,
policymakers, and providers of services at three
distinct points in time. The study’s baseline is the
pattern of relations that was in place in the period
immediately prior to the reforms. Having established
this baseline we then examine what role collective
actors played in the negotiation of the reforms
themselves. And finally we examine the pattern of
relations in the post-reform period. This temporal
analysis is conducted for reforms in healthcare and of
social assistance, because they are directly related to
poverty reduction, have seen significant institutional
reforms in the mid-1980s to the early 2000s, and
represent distinct types of public goods. 
As Gurza Lavalle notes in this IDS Bulletin, the
reforms undertaken by national and sub-national
governments are tremendously varied and reflect the
effects of contextual political processes. Measured
against the policy packages advocated by bi- and
multi-lateral organisations, and widely debated in the
literature on public sector reform, the institutional
changes undertaken in Brazil, India, and Mexico
appear hopelessly heterodox. Mindful of this variety
and complexity, we have nonetheless sought to
select national-level reforms that, in broad terms,
embody voice or choice-oriented logics, and then
specific programmes executed by city administrations
that attempt to make these reforms land locally.3
In Brazil, health reforms have been voice-oriented –
universalisation of access to healthcare with the
Unified Health System (SUS) has been accompanied
by significant decentralisation and the creation of
deliberative governance councils in which collective
actors representing diverse interests are guaranteed
seats. The largest component of the social assistance
reforms has, in contrast, followed a choice-logic
involving monthly income grants to poor families,
through the federal Bolsa Família programme and
municipal programmes such as Renda Mínima. In
Mexico reforms in both sectors have largely been
choice-oriented: the staccato health sector reforms
have combined decentralisation and market-
enhancing institutional change, and social assistance
has shifted towards targeted and conditional income
transfers. Nonetheless, in the case of reproductive
health there have been important voice-enhancing
institutional changes. In India the most significant
institutional changes have been broad reforms of the
state, such as decentralisation (through the 74th
constitutional amendment) and the Right to
Information Act, which have potentially significant
implications for social accountability of the health
and social assistance sectors. These reforms are in
part voice-oriented, as they seek to enhance citizens’
rights and leverage vis-à-vis public bureaucracy. 
BIM does not attempt to make direct comparisons
between specific institutional changes that have
taken place in the countries’ respective and highly
varied social assistance and health sectors. Nor does
it attempt direct comparison of specific programmes
such as TPDS and Renda Mínima. The study makes
comparisons of a more general order: it compares
underlying processes that, in different contexts and
sectors, produce similar types of state reforms –
which we summarise as voice or choice orientations
– and it compares types of changes in the interaction
between state and civil society actors that result
from these different reform processes.
2.1 The hypotheses
The hypotheses we explore through the comparisons
– i.e. at a relatively high level of generality – are four.
1 Reforms aimed at enhancing voice (decentralisation
and institutionalised participation) are more likely to
enhance the capacity of networks of collective actors
representing poor communities to engage in forms
of social accountability. Conversely, choice-oriented
reforms are more likely to undermine that capacity.
2 Reform processes in which networks of collective
actors representing poor communities participate
in negotiating reforms are more likely to create
effective and durable accountability relations
between such actors, on the one hand, to
policymakers and, on the other, to providers who
must change their behaviour. 
2a Participation in policymaking creates incentives
for, and enhances the capacity of, these collective
actors to monitor and engage with policymakers
and providers. 
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2b Participation in policymaking allows collective
actors to construct their fit with emerging
institutions – i.e. establish a degree of
embeddedness in public institutions – to facilitate
future access, thereby lowering the costs of social
accountability over the medium and long term.
3 Networks of collective actors that cut across
class, such as alliances of middle-class NGOs and
membership associations or community groups,
have greater capacity to engage in forms of social
accountability of both policymakers and of local
providers. Where networks are linked to broader
political movements this capacity is further
enhanced. 
3a The actors who establish accountability relations
with local providers are likely to be community or
membership organisations that have not,
themselves, participated in the policy process. If
they are part of the same network of actors who
do participate in the policy process, which will
tend to be more professionalised (and possibly
middle class), then local accountability will be
enhanced.
4 The exercise of social accountability by collective
actors representing poor communities increases
the likelihood of uptake of reforms by providers,
as well as by communities (who then create
demand for services).
2.2 Moving towards ‘big’ governance research
Governance research takes many forms but its
central ambition is to identify the complex processes
of change that contribute to better governance, and
to draw broad lessons about these processes that
will hold for a range of countries or contexts. The
research designs that are particularly well suited to
address significant governance questions that face
the international development community,
Houtzager and Acharya argue in their contribution,
are interdisciplinary, process-oriented, and multi-
country or multi-region comparisons. Such research
is logistically complex, requires relatively high levels of
funding, and by social science standards long
timeframes. The structure of national universities and
research institutes, as well as that of many
international organisations, they point out, instead
favour disciplinary research, conducted within
relatively short timeframes, using either quantitative
snapshots (even in the case of panel data) or case
studies built on distinct analytic or fieldwork models. 
In their presentation of the study’s methodology,
Houtzager and Acharya identify a set of institutional
innovations that make possible a move towards the
type of ‘big governance research’ that begins to
meet the information and knowledge requirements
of contemporary governance questions. BIM’s
methodology combines analysis at three different
levels. The first level consists of narrative accounts of
the political process of (national) reforms in health
and social assistance sectors, and case studies of a
municipal-level programme in each sector that
embodies the essence of these reforms. The second
level uses network analyses to identify changes from
the pre- to post-reform period in the capacity of civil
society actors, as a consequence of the reforms, to
negotiate policy. The capacity to negotiate policies,
the authors believe, resides in part in the types of
relations civil society actors establish amongst
themselves, and between their network and policy
makers. The third level differs from the others in that
it is concerned only with the post-reform period and
whether social accountability contributes to
improved services. It focuses on relations of social
accountability between local community actors and
providers across regions of each city, and uses cross-
sectional analysis of social accountability and service
provision in health and social assistance.
The innovative organisational and funding model for
governance research developed by the Centre for
the Future State (CFS) has provided the institutional
foundation for this comparative and multi-level
research design. The CFS has made it possible to
form well-coupled research teams – that is, teams in
which researchers based in disparate countries are
able to make a sustained collective investment in
designing and conducting research. Such teams are
able to undertake multi-country studies that feature
a single analytic framework and a coherent
comparative methodology, and in which members
conduct fieldwork in their respective countries in
rigorously comparable ways.
3 Early lessons, and a puzzle
A key idea framing the BIM study and the articles in
this IDS Bulletin is that opportunities for social
accountability can change substantially with public
sector reforms, sometimes in unexpected ways.
Reorganising how services are delivered, or even the
nature of the service itself, as in the case of anti-
poverty programmes examined here, can lead to the
emergence of new actors and institutions,
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strengthen or weaken existing actors, and
consequently can alter the alliance possibilities of the
urban poor. Here the authors want to highlight a
few lessons, and a puzzle, that appear prominently in
several of the articles in this IDS Bulletin.
3.1 Engineering institutional fit
The articles in this IDS Bulletin suggest collective
actors who succeed in engineering some form of
institutional fit to the state’s decision-making centres
increase their ability in the medium to long term to
engage in social accountability (Hypothesis 2b). This
institutional fit can take many forms, from
participatory governance councils for health in São
Paulo, designed in part to enhance the leverage of
the health movement, to the Inter-institutional
Group on Reproductive Health designed in part to
provide Mexico’s women’s movement a privileged
position in designing reproductive health policy and
monitoring implementation.4
By way of contrast, the anti-poverty programmes
Oportunidades and Renda Mínima lack such
institutional mechanisms for organisations
representing intended beneficiaries. Hevia and
Houtzager both note that these programmes were
designed in part to limit or eliminate the influence of
organisations that have historically mediated relations
between the state and the poor. Oportunidades
instead created, from above, community assemblies
for the participation of individual citizens and a
Citizens Complaints System. As Hevia observes,
however, how can an indigenous woman who
speaks little or no Spanish denounce ‘... the municipal
authority who forces her to attend party meetings or
who threatens to cut off her benefits if she does not
vote in accordance with this or that party?’. In the
case of Renda Mínima no channels for participation
were created – individual beneficiaries can only lodge
complaints with the municipal administration, or
seek the mediation of local politicians or other
influential persons.
In the cases examined in this IDS Bulletin, civil society
actors have been more likely to engineer some form
of institutional fit during moments of significant state
reform. The actors who were involved in the policy
process during reform moments were in a privileged
position to engineer these new institutions in ways
that enable their medium- to long-term role in both
policy and social accountability. Notably, the
Sanitaristas in Brazil and women’s movement in
Mexico drove the reform process from the start,
whereas no such collective agents were involved in
the creation of Oportunidades or Renda Mínima.
Differently, Pande shows that the advocacy NGO
Parivatan, as a consequence of its social accountability
role in the TPDS programme, has been invited to take
part in policy discussions. This new role has not,
however, been accompanied by the creation of
governance institutions that ensures its access to
policymakers over the medium to long term.
Parivatan provides a test case in this regard: will it be
able to institutionalise its role, given there was no
opportunity to engineer institutional fit when the
original Public Distribution System (PDS) was created,
nor during the reforms that led to TPDS.
3.2 Alliances across the public–private divide
Studies of public sector reform often highlight the
obstacles public sector professionals, and their trade
associations in particular, pose to major institutional
change. In several of our cases, however, it is groups
of reformist public sector professionals who played
the central role in pushing for reforms that increased
service coverage and quality. In some cases these
professional groups became important allies to the
movements of the urban poor. And at least in one
case, the creation of the universal healthcare system
in Brazil, such a professional group went so far as to
stimulate the formation of an urban health
movement that would seek the expansion of health
coverage to poor regions. The Sanitarista public
health movement, made up overwhelmingly of
public sector healthcare professionals, not only led
the process that created the country’s Unified Health
System (SUS), Dowbor shows in her contribution,
but actively organised poor urban areas of São Paulo
to make demands for the implementation of the
new system in those areas. Public sector health
professionals in Mexico have similarly played a critical
role in the more piecemeal reforms of that sector
(Blanco-Mancilla 2007). 
The entry of prominent civil society leaders into the
state itself to help design and/or implement the
reforms is an important part of constructing alliances
that cut across the public–private divide in some of
our cases. In Mexico for example, the alliance
between women’s organisations and the Health
Secretary was established when the latter was still at
the head of a prominent civil society organisation.
When Julio Frenk was invited to become Health
Secretary, he brought his previous relations with
Houtzager and Joshi Introduction: Contours of a Research Project and Early Findings6
members of the National Forum into the state and
helped establish an alliance across the public–private
divide that played a key role in the expansion of
women’s reproductive healthcare (Gómez-Jauregui,
this IDS Bulletin).
In most of these cases reformist public sector
professionals created their own networks, and
sometimes organisations, that ran outside of their
labour organisations. This suggests a function division
of labour between reformist organisations
concerned with improving public sector performance
and labour unions concerned with negotiating
employment terms and conditions.
3.3 Anti-poverty policies: eliminating the
mediation of ‘bad’ civil society
Social policy in Latin America and India has until
recently focused almost exclusively on workers in the
formal sector – unemployment, disability, and old
age pensions, as well as healthcare was largely
restricted to workers with formal employment
relations. Two of the articles in this IDS Bulletin
address the profound change that has occurred in
this regard in Latin America, with the creation of
conditional cash transfer and minimum income
guarantee programmes. Programmes such as Renda
Mínima, Bolsa Família, and Oportunidades now
extend a minimal form of social protection to low-
income families that depend on the income of
workers outside of the formal labour market. The
programmes provide poor families monthly income
transfers, conditional on fulfilling obligations such as
class attendance of all school-aged children. 
In contrast to the experience of health discussed
above, the profound expansion of the state’s role in
combating poverty has occurred with little or no
involvement of organisations representing poor
communities. The processes through which the
programmes were designed sought to exclude the
participation of civil society actors. The programmes
attempt to establish a direct relation between the
state agency that executes the programme and the
beneficiary families. One of the goals of doing so is
eliminating the mediation of what is considered ‘bad’
civil society – that is, clientelist and authoritarian civil
society organisations that have historically mediated
relations between the state and the poor. Arguably
both ‘bad’ and ‘good’ civil society actors have been
kept at arms length as a consequence and there is
therefore an absence of effective collective agents
who can monitor execution, demand improvements
or rectification of error, and ensure some form of
public budgetary accounting. 
3.4 Mutually reinforcing or exclusive governance
roles?
In her contribution to this IDS Bulletin, Jayal raises
one of the principal puzzles faced by advocates of
civil society organisations’ role as agents of social
accountability. NGOs, membership associations, and
community groups increasingly play multiple
governance roles, some of which appear to be
mutually reinforcing but others appear to be
mutually exclusive. In broad strokes, civil organisations
are being called upon, or have called upon
themselves, to exercise four distinct governance roles
that stand in varying degrees of tension to each
other: participation in policy negotiations,
co-administration of public services, delivery of public
services, and finally social accountability. 
Participation in policymaking is often seen to threaten
the autonomy of civil society actors, and hence
compromising their ability to engage in social
accountability. The BIM study hypothesises the
opposite: participation in policy negotiation and social
accountability are mutually reinforcing. Actors who
participate in policymaking will have a powerful
interest in seeing the resulting policies implemented,
and greater capacity to monitor such implementation.
Where these policy actors are networked to local or
community organisations that can establish direct
accountability relations with providers, the prospects
for effective social accountability, and possibly
improved service coverage and quality, are greater.
Pande points out that the causal arrow for Parivatan
is in the reverse direction – recognition of one’s role
in social accountability can lead to involvement in
policymaking. At least in our cases, there may
therefore be a larger mutually reinforcing dynamic
between policy negotiation and social accountability
than we had originally hypothesised. 
Are the service delivery and social accountability roles
mutually reinforcing or, virtually by definition, mutually
exclusive? Actors who deliver services under public
contract or as part of public–private partnerships
cannot engage in social accountability of their own
relation to end-users or the general public. At best
they can engage in self-regulation, or come under
the oversight of a public but independent regulatory
body. The dynamics of accountability are different,
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however, in the relation of non-government
providers to the state. When state agencies contract
out service delivery they in effect create a new layer
of actors with a direct interest in expanding and
sustaining that service – that is, a ‘lobby’ of providers.
This provider-lobby has a set of interests that partially
overlap with those of people living in poverty. For
example, ensuring that the entire budgetary
allocation for a service is actually spent by the
administration is in the interest of both the lobby and
end-users, as is increasing the number of qualified
staff in primary healthcare units that non-profit
providers manage. The normative position many non-
profit providers have in favour of their clients
reinforces the potential for alliances between this
layer of organisation and those of the poor. Not
infrequently providers engage in forms of assumed
representation of their client base when the latter
are unorganised and/or lack access to the state.5
The most complex case of the puzzle Jayal has
identified, however, is that of civil society
organisations that are involved in three or four of
these roles, sometimes as members of new
participatory governance institutions. In São Paulo,
for example, civil society organisations have
constitutionally guaranteed seats on the municipal
governance councils, in the areas of health,
education, social assistance, and child and adolescent.
These councils combine policymaking, oversight,
management, and accountability roles. In the case of
education in Delhi, Mehtta’s contribution traces how
a substantial number of education NGOs have been
involved in the designing, implementation, and
monitoring of the 2002 education reform, which
seeks to guarantee universal access to public
education. Under the new Universal Elementary
Education Programme (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, SSA)
NGO-run Learning Centres prepare young children
from poor families for entry into the public school
system. Mehtta notes a potentially interesting
development in the programme: the monitoring of
the Learning Centres by public bodies made up of
School Welfare Committees representing teachers
and parents, government education officials, and
implementing NGOs. 
Conclusion
Jayal’s concern about the potential tension between
different governance roles provides a good end point
for this Introduction. It in effect defines an important
research frontier as our knowledge of social
accountability advances. The contributions to this IDS
Bulletin, and the BIM study, are a first at developing a
more nuanced and empirically grounded
understanding of the mutually reinforcing or
exclusive nature of these civil society governance
roles, and of the new governance institutions that
attempt to combine these roles in innovative but
possibly contradictory ways.
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Notes
1 See Mainwaring and Welna (2003) and Schedler
et al. (1999), and for OECD countries see Cain et
al. (2003).
2 This distinction is not universally made. The World
Bank, for example, employs a notion of social
accountability in its programmes and studies that
obscures these substantial differences between
the agency and possibilities of individual and
collective action (cf. Ackerman 2005).
3 The two poles have also been described as
‘neoliberal’ and ‘deliberative’ (alternatively:
co-governance or stakeholder governance)
(cf. Ansell and Gingrich 2003; Evans 2005).
4 The privileged and institutionalised access to the
state that some actors are able to engineer
greatly lower the cost of obtaining information
about state activity and of engaging in policy
negotiations. For a discussion of institutional fit,
see Houtzager (2003) and Joshi in this IDS
Bulletin.
5 See Houtzager and Gurza Lavalle (forthcoming)
and Gurza Lavalle et al. (2005).
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